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ABSTRACT 
IT TECHNOLOGIES ARE INCREASINGLY BEING USED TO OFFER COMPUTING RESOURCES OR INFORMATION IN 
DIFFERENT LOCATIONS USING NETWORK RESOURCES. IN THIS PAPER WE ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF 
ALLOCATING RESOURCES TO ENABLE CUSTOMERS COMPOSE THEIR OWN DESIRED SERVICES. WE PROPOSE AN 
AUCTION MECHANISM THAT COMPRISES INDEPENDENT AUCTIONS PERFORMED BY EACH PROVIDER AND 
INVESTIGATE BIDDING STRATEGIES AND SOCIAL WELFARE.  
KEYWORDS 
Auctions, Broadband Networks, Services, Resource Allocation   
1. INTRODUCTION 
The pace of innovation in computer and networking technology allows many new IT services to 
emerge rapidly and often benefit from new network services that support faster connectivity 
and better performance. Centralized resources that are used to provide services to customers are 
impractical in a dynamic service-based system owned by multiple organizations. The new 
service oriented business environment enables service providers to dynamically integrate 
services across networks according to their customers’ needs. This is achieved by exploiting IT 
resources that are easy to access no matter where they reside. For example, network service 
providers offer bandwidth to customers who are interested in buying content (e-books, music, 
streaming media) from web sites (content providers) or virtual machines (supporting operating 
systems or processes) from Amazon (grid service providers). 
In order to keep pace with evolving business needs and increasing complexity in service 
oriented businesses, providers face the challenge of managing performance issues and network 
constraints that affect customers’ satisfaction received by using the offered services. In other 
words, there is a need to provide cost effective connectivity to all locations around the world, 
while enabling the convergence of voice, data, and internet services. This complexity of 
allocating different kinds of resources seen as complementary goods and owned by different 
providers, makes traditional resource allocation approaches insufficient to reveal market 
information and optimize the system’s performance.   
In this paper, we address the problem of managing resources in systems that offer services in a 
distributed environment. We use a game theoretic approach to understand how customers’ 
information flows from one system to another and how customers can become active and value 
International Journal of Distributed and Parallel Systems (IJDPS) Vol.1, No.2, November 2010 
36 
 
generators. In particular, we propose an auction mechanism that comprises independent 
auctions performed by each provider for resource allocation, without requiring their cooperation 
in the composition of a service that uses the auctioned resources. We adjust the VCG payment 
rule [1] in our approach and argue that sincere bidding is still an optimal strategy. We perform 
experiments applying our approach, in order to measure the degree of the exposure problem and 
thus the social welfare loss. The results show that the performance is generally good and the 
social welfare attained is close to the optimal one. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 overviews related work on combinatorial 
auctions. Section 3 describes the model and the proposed auction mechanism. Section 4 
provides the experimental results that measure the social welfare loss and Section 5 provides 
some concluding remarks.  
2. RELATED WORK 
Much of the existing literature on auction theory analyzes the multi-object auction game. Often, 
in such auctions the goods and the bids for them are complementary, meaning that the value of 
a good to a bidder depends on which other goods he wins. Because of the possibility of such 
dependences in values, mechanism design theory suggests that single bids for combinations of 
goods are allowed. This has an impact on the complexity of the winner determination problem 
which is proved to be an NP-complete problem [2]. Many studies propose special structures in 
the allowed combinatorial bids in order to guarantee computational tractability ([3], [4]) and 
others propose designs in which bidders are forced to submit individual bids for each distinct 
good increasing mechanism complexity (rules difficult to analyze and understand) in order to 
eliminate the exposure problem and  thus efficiency loss ([5], [6], [7]). 
In [3], the problem of designing simultaneous multi-object auctions is addressed. Bidders are 
allowed to submit combinations of bids since their value depends on which objects they win. 
The authors identify different structures of combinatorial bids for which computational 
tractability is accessed. In [4], the authors study special settings in combinatorial auctions in 
which the winner determination problem can be solved in polynomial time. A graph with a 
desired property is constructed and bids are modelled as a connected set of vertices. The 
problem of constructing the graph and handling the winner determination is solved.   
In [5], simultaneous clock auctions for many divisible goods that are offered by one seller are 
studied. The seller’s objective is a combination of efficiency and revenue optimization. Natural 
linkages among goods (substitutes or complements) are also encountered. Two economic 
models are presented in which the allocation of goods is efficient and sincere bidding is proved 
to be an equilibrium strategy. In [6], complementary goods without bundling are auctioned by 
one seller. First price and second price auctions are examined in terms of equilibrium outcomes 
under the assumption that the value of the whole demanded bundle is higher than that of any 
incomplete bundle. In [7], Milgrom addresses the package allocation problem in which traders 
buy or sell combinations of goods. A survey of various mechanisms is presented emphasizing 
on the problems that arise when some of the goods are not substitutes.  
Many studies have been proposed in the communication networks sector, dealing with the 
resource allocation problem ([8], [9], [10], [11], [12]). In [8], Cramton focuses on spectrum 
auction design where many heterogeneous items are auctioneered. The package clock auction is 
analysed in which bidders bid on packages of lots. It is proved that efficiency is improved 
through truthful bidding. In [9], a bandwidth pricing mechanism that solves congestion 
problems in communication problems is presented. An efficient allocation is obtained when an 
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infinitely divisible resource is to be shared among users who are allowed to submit several bids 
in order to establish a connection. Lazar and Semret propose in [10] the Progressive Second  
Price auction to perform bandwidth allocation in a network of arbitrary topology by running 
independent auctions in each link. In [11], the authors present a mechanism of a set of 
simultaneous multi-unit descending-price auctions for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide 
basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period, attaining nearly efficient 
bandwidth allocation. In [12] a network auction mechanism is proposed wherein agents can 
express their bid for a whole path. The authors prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium which 
yields the efficient allocation. 
The above studies assume that the distinct goods are sold by the same seller. In this paper we 
assume that each good is sold by a different seller and bidders submit independent bids (of their 
desired bundle) in each auction.       
3. THE MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
3.1. Assumptions 
We begin our study by formulating the resource allocation problem of two service providers A 
and B who independently want to offer services to a common group of N customers in a 
specific time interval. In order to deliver a service, each provider sells divisible resources of 
finite capacity. In particular provider A sells good 1 with capacity 1C (e.g. bandwidth) and 
provider B sells good 2 with capacity 2C  (e.g. computing power). The two types of resources 
are assumed to be complementary meaning that each customer may be willing to buy quantities 
of both of them in order to benefit from a combined service offered to him. (Such a customer is 
called inelastic in the sense that he is willing either to obtain all the bundle of the two goods or 
take nothing of them.)  
Each provider’s objective is to allocate his resources efficiently without revealing private 
information (e.g market power) to the other provider. We assume that each customer has a 
private value for each bundle of goods and that total demand of goods 1 and 2, 1D and 
2D respectively for the examined time interval are publicly observed (symmetric information 
among bidders). Our goal is to achieve an efficient outcome and reveal correct signals about 
capacity demands for each good. We propose an auctioning mechanism in which independent 
sealed-bid auctions are performed for each good by each service provider. For simplicity 
reasons we have assumed two types of resources, though our model can be generalized to 
consider K types of resources. 
 
3.2. Bidding rules 
We assume 3 types of bidders: bidders of type 1 demand units of good 1, bidders of type 2 
demand units of good 2 (“individual” bidders), and bidders of type 3 demand units of both 
goods 1 and 2 (“combinatorial” bidders). 
Bidder’s i private value is denoted by 12,2,1,,...1, == jNiv ij for good j , where the case 
12=j represents the “combinatorial” bidder. Bidder’s i bid in auction j  is 
2,1,,...1),,( === jNibqs ijijij
r
, where ijq is the demanded quantity of good j and ijb is the total 
price for the demanded quantity. Combinatorial bidders submit two bids, one for each good. It 
is assumed that each bidder chooses bidding strategies that maximize his profit.  
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3.3. Winner determination-Payment rule 
Consider the set 2,1},,...,1,{ === jNisS ijj
r
of bids in auction j . Each provider sorts the bids in 
each jS  according to price per unit Niqbp
i
j
i
j
i
j ,...,1,/ == and assigns demanded quantities up 
to capacity constraint. The last winning bidder is assigned the remaining amount (might be less 
than his demand). 
We apply the VCG payment rule [1], according to which each bidder is charged the social 
opportunity cost that his presence entails and ensures that the optimal strategy for a bidder is to 
bid the true values of the goods (sincere bidding). Formally, bidder i is charged 
)(),0( jiiji vSWvSW
rr
−
−
−
− where iSW− is the social welfare (sum of values of bidder that win in 
the efficient outcome) of bidders other than i , jv
r
 is the vector of bidders’ reported values for 
auction j and ),0( ijv −
r is the efficient outcome if bidder’s i  reported value were 0 and the other 
bidders' reports remain unchanged. Thus, each bidder pays the losing bids that would be 
winning if his own bid were set to 0.  
In our context the auction outcome by applying the above rule is affected by the demand 
information “combinatorial” bidders possess and we need to investigate whether this 
assumption affects the optimality condition.  
3.4. Bidding strategies 
In this paragraph we will investigate the bidding strategies of all types of bidders under the 
above rules. We already know that sincere bidding (revealing the true values for the demanded 
quantity is an optimal strategy if the VCG rule is applied provided that each bidder has a 
privately known value for the good offered. Thus, the “individual” bidders’ strategy is not 
affected by the presence of the “combinatorial” bidders. On the other hand a “combinatorial” 
bidder knows his own private value for the demanded bundle of goods but not the proportion of 
that value to each good separately. We propose the following bidding strategy and argue that it 
reserves the sincere bidding condition. 
“Combinatorial” bidder i divides his total budget ib (which equals iv12 if he is sincere bidding) 
according to the following rule: ii b
CDCD
CDb
2211
11
1 //
/
+
= and ii b
CDCD
CDb
2211
22
2 //
/
+
= , 
where 2,1,
1
==∑
=
jqD
N
i
i
jj . Factor ii CD / measures the competitiveness between the two goods 
(the more aggressive the bidding is in one auction the higher the part of budget in this auction 
is) and forces “combinatorial” bidders to bid sincerely.  
The reasoning behind this statement is as follows. Suppose that bidder i submits his whole 
budget ib to the first auction and nothing to the second one ( ),( 11 iii bqs =
r
 and )0,( 22 ii qs =
r ). 
Then he maximizes the probability of winning in auction 1 and minimizes the probability of 
winning in auction 2. He ends up with good 1and makes negative profit since good 1alone is 
useless to him (even if he has already paid for it). This is called the exposure problem that we 
will refer to below.  
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Suppose now that bidder i submits his whole budget ib to both auctions (( ),( 11 iii bqs =
r
 and 
),( 22 iii bqs =
r ) and lies about his true value. Then he maximizes the probability of winning in 
both auctions but maximizes the risk of paying more for the desired bundle than he is willing to 
(negative profit).  
An intermediate case is when bidder i divides equally his budget to the two auctions 
( )2/,( 11 iii bqs =
r
 and )2/,( 22 iii bqs =
r ). Then he increases the probability of winning in the less 
competitive auction and decreases the probability of winning in the more competitive auction, 
again increasing the risk of obtaining only one of the two goods (negative profit). 
Thus, bidding less or more than his true value or dividing randomly his budget in the two 
auctions, a “combinatorial” bidder can never increase his profit but may sometimes decrease it.  
3.5. Social welfare loss - exposure problem 
The proposed auction mechanism faces the well known ‘exposure problem” [8]: it is described 
as the risk to obtain a bundle of goods, when combinatorial bidding is not allowed, that may 
lead to paying more for some individual goods than they are worth. This is due to the fact that 
we do not allow combinatorial bids and a bidder that desires a combination of goods might win 
in some auctions and lose in others, winning finally a bundle of goods that it smaller than the 
desired one. This has as a result a loss in social welfare so that the outcome might not be 
efficient. We investigate the magnitude of this problem in our approach by running experiments 
described in the next section.  
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section presents the simulation methodology adopted in order to study the problem of this 
paper and provides some indicative simulation results. The section is concluded with a 
summary of the main findings from our study by means of simulations 
4.1. Simulation Model and Methodology 
In order to evaluate our auctioning scheme, we have implemented a specialized simulator in the 
Java programming language. We have conducted a plethora of simulations according to a very 
detailed model specifying:  
a) The bidding population mix, i.e. percentage of users bidding for resource 1, resource 2 
and resources 1 and 2. 
b) The amount of users’ wealth, i.e. the per-unit price of each user’s bid. 
c) The quantity of units of resources sought.  
In particular, for the bidders demanding units of just one resource, both the quantity and per-
unit price of each user are individually randomly drawn from uniform distributions having 
support in ],1[ maxrq  and ],1[ maxrp  respectively. Note that the support of the distribution is in 
general different per resource r. This is justified by the fact that the two resources actually 
comprise different markets, where the expected willingness to pay of the users is in general 
different. For instance, the per-unit price of 1 Mbps of bandwidth is in general different than 
that of 1 virtual machine of a Grid computing provider.  
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For the bidders demanding – a generally different number of – units of both resources 1 and 2, 
the quantity of units sought per resource is drawn from two different uniform distributions, one 
per resource, having the same support with that of the bidders demanding just one resource; 
their wealth is drawn from a distribution having support which is in general different than that 
of the bidders demanding units of just one resource. 
Also, note that since our approach relies on the splitting of the latter bidders’ budget per 
resource based on the factor ii CD / , which measures the competitiveness between the two 
goods, it is also important to study the sensitivity of the simulation results on the accurate noise 
of this factor ii CD / . This is important since in cases where the providers are reluctant to 
announce (accurately) this factor to the market, the bidders may only deduce it by observing the 
two markets and the fluctuation of the auction cut-off prices in these markets. In this case, there 
may be a noise in the estimate of ii CD / , which will affect the budget splitting and ultimately 
the bidders’ success in the two auctions. This is why in our simulation environment we have 
included a variable n that captures this effect of noise of estimate. If variable n is set to 1.0, then 
there is no noise in the estimate and essentially budget is split according to the ii CD /  factor. A 
greater value of n implies that more of the budget is to be offered for the auction for resource 1 
and less for the auction of resource 2, while the opposite that the user’s bid for the sought units 
of resource 1 will be less compared to that that would be attained if the splitting had been done 
according to the factor ii CD / . In the simulations presented, unless explicitly specified 
otherwise, it is implicitly assumed that the splitting of budget is “accurately” done by means of 
the factor ii CD / . 
Furthermore, note that the relations of the values used as the upper bound of the users’ demand 
distributions compared to the respective capacity constraint of the resource, allows us to 
flexibly express a multitude of market conditions. For instance, assume the case where the 
value of iqmax is relatively close to that of iC : this situation may arise in practise if few large 
ISPs compete in order to purchase bandwidth for Internet connectivity for their customers from 
the larger backbone providers of a region. Thus, this setting of parameters is suitable to depict 
an oligopoly market. On the contrary, a large difference of the values of these simulation model 
parameters may pertain to the case of a competitive market where many small users compete 
for the bandwidth of a broadband network. 
Overall, we argue that our simulation model is both general enough and adequate to allow for a 
detailed and thorough study of the issues of interest of this paper. Finally, note that in order for 
our results to be unaffected by the noise of independent runs, we have adopted the approach of 
running a large number of experiments and subsequently averaging on the key performance 
metrics of interest.  
Finally, it is also of great interest to assess the proximity of the performance of the individual 
auctions (assuming that bidders demanding units of both resources split their budget according 
to the ii CD /  factor as explained earlier in this paper) to the best possible – in terms of social 
welfare – for each simulation run we also compute the social optimum outcome. This is done 
by means of a special algorithm that actually runs a combinatorial auction, which is the social 
optimum way of allocating the resources. Obviously, the exposure problem never arises under 
the combinatorial approach since the optimal allocation of resources is derived.  
Note however that the latter would be impossible to do in practise for a multitude of resources 
and possible bundles, while the approach of running individual auctions can be applied in 
practise for an arbitrarily large number of resources and users. An additional problem of the 
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combinatorial approach is that it relies on the cooperation of the different providers, while 
revenue sharing in this context cannot be generally done in an unambiguously fair and 
transparent way, since bids are submitted for combinations of resources that are owned by 
multiple providers. 
The main key performance metrics in our study are the following: 
Exposure problem percentage: The percentage of bidders demanding units of both resources 
1 and 2 that managed to reserve the units demanded at exactly one of the two auctions; these 
bidders are henceforth referred to as “exposed bidders”. This percentage is computed as the 
ratio of the exposed bidders over the total number of bidders demanding units of both resources 
1 and 2. 
Social welfare percentage loss: Having computed the social welfare of the individual auctions 
and that of the combinatorial approach (which attains the maximum social welfare) we compute 
the percentile deviation from the maximum. Note that in the calculation of the social welfare 
under the independent auctions approach the utility of the exposed bidders is taken to be 0.  
4.2. Simulations 
Having presented the simulation model and methodology, we now proceed to present some 
indicative simulations that demonstrate the main results of our study. 
The first set of experiments is obtained from 30 simulation runs where the simulation 
parameters are set to depict an oligopoly market. In particular, there are 20 bidders demanding 
at most 10 units of resource 1 whose capacity is 100 units, 10 bidders demanding at most 5 
units of resource 2 whose capacity is 30 units and finally 5 bidders demanding at most 10 units 
of resource 1 and at most 5 units of resource 2. The maximum per unit price for the first 
category of bidders (i.e. the upper bound of the support of the uniform distribution from which 
the value realizations are randomly drawn) is set to 1000 cents, while that of the other two 
categories of bidders is set to 2000 cents. 
Note that due to the fact that the bidders competing for resources in both auctions for resources 
1 and 2 do not have a higher average per-unit price compared to the bidders competing only for 
units of resource 2, this is a scenario where the exposure problem is likely to arise since the 
wealth of the bidders demanding both types of resources does not suffice to guarantee their 
success in both the auctions where they have to participate.  
We now proceed to present the results for this group of simulations: 
The average percentile social welfare loss (the average is computed over the 30 simulation 
runs) is 1.48%. It is also worth noting that in 21 out of 30 simulations (70% of the simulation 
runs) it is actually 0, thus the individual auctions where bidders employ the budget split 
according to the way proposed in this paper attain the maximum social welfare. Figure 1 depicts 
the social welfare and the maximum social welfare per simulation run. 
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Figure 1.  Social welfare plot in an oligopoly setting.  
The average percentage of exposed bidders is 7.3%. Note that this percentage is 
relatively high due to the small number of bidders (set to 5) that demand resources in 
both auctions. Thus, even if just one bidder suffers from the exposure problem, this 
immediately results in a 20% percentage. However, in 70% of the simulation runs of 
this group of experiments, the exposure problem never appears. This is a very good 
result, given that – as explained earlier in this subsection – this specific scenario is 
inherently susceptible to the exposure problem. The percentage of exposed bidders per 
simulation run is depicted as Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  The percentage of bidders demanding units of both resources 1 and 2 that suffered 
from the exposure problem. 
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The second set of experiments is obtained from 30 simulation runs where the simulation 
parameters are set to depict a competitive market where the size of the individual bidders 
demand is small compared to the capacity of the resources auctioned. In particular, there are 
100 bidders demanding at most 5 units of resource 1 whose capacity is 500 units, 100 bidders 
demanding at most 3 units of resource 2 whose capacity is 100 units and finally 25 bidders 
demanding at most 10 units of resource 1 and at most 5 units of resource 2. The maximum per 
unit price for the all the bidders (i.e. the upper bound of the support of the uniform distribution 
from which the value realizations are randomly drawn) is set to 1000 cents. 
We now proceed to present the results for this group of simulations: 
The average percentile social welfare loss (the average is computed over the 30 simulation 
runs) is 1.8%. Thus, it is once more very small, almost negligible given the market size of this 
simulation run. Figure 3 depicts the social welfare and the maximum social welfare per 
simulation run. 
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Figure 3.  Social welfare plot in a competitive setting.  
 
The average percentage of exposed bidders is 16.36%. Note that this percentage is 
relatively high but this is mostly due to the fact that there are many high value bidders 
for the scarce resources 1 and 2 that bid just for units of one resource and whose 
willingness to pay is similar to that of the bidders desiring units of both resources. The 
percentage of exposed bidders per simulation run is depicted as Figure 2. 
International Journal of Distributed and Parallel Systems (IJDPS) Vol.1, No.2, November 2010 
44 
 
Exposure Problem Chart
0
10
20
30
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
Simulation
Ex
po
se
d 
B
id
de
rs
 
(%
)
Percentage of exposed bidders
 
Figure 4.  The percentage of bidders demanding units of both resources 1 and 2 that suffered 
from the exposure problem. 
Finally, we have run a plethora of simulations to assess the impact of the noise of estimate of 
the noise in the estimate of the factor ii CD /  that affects the bidding strategy of the bidders 
demanding units of both resources 1 and 2. In order to illustrate this, we keep the same setting 
with the previous group of simulations and introduce a noise in estimate of 20%. We then rerun 
a set of 30 simulations (keeping all other simulation parameters constant) in order to assess the 
impact of this noise in both the social welfare attained and the exposure problem incurred by 
the bidders. 
The impact on the social welfare is small in terms of absolute numbers, i.e. there is no 
significant difference in the value of the percentile social welfare loss which in this case 
becomes 2,6%. This is due to the fact that the population of users that aim to reserve units in 
both resources 1 and 2 is relatively small compared to rival bidders; thus the impact of 
misallocation of goods due to the exposure problem is small in the total sum of all agents’ 
utilities, i.e. the social welfare. Note however that the relative change is significant. So is the 
case with the percentage of the exposed bidders, which becomes 22.9%. This demonstrates the 
necessity of having an accurate estimate of the demand exhibited for the two resources but is 
also proof of the success of the budget splitting strategy proposed in this paper. 
4.3. Main Findings 
In this subsection, we briefly summarize the main findings of our simulations study. The main 
findings are as follows: 
The performance of the proposed scheme is generally good and the social welfare attained is 
close to the optimal one. 
a) The exposure problem seldom arises and mostly pertains to bidders that would not be 
winners if a combinatorial approach were adopted.  
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b) The proposed budget splitting method according to the ii CD /  factor is successful. 
c) The accurate knowledge or alternatively an accurate estimate of the ii CD /  factor 
further mitigates the exposure problem. 
d) Only large errors in the estimate of the ii CD /  factor significantly reduce the 
performance of the individual auctions approach under the proposed budget splitting 
approach. 
The generality of these results if the units of multiple, more than 2, resources are auctioned, is 
left for future work. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we propose a novel approach to allocate resources from different locations, using 
independent sealed-bid auctions for each type of resources performed by different service 
providers for each type. We apply the VCG payment rule and investigate the bidding strategies 
that force bidders reveal their true values and split them in an almost efficient manner among 
the various auctions. We perform experiments to show the applicability of our approach and 
verify the effectiveness of the results. In particular, we measure the extend to which the 
exposure problem appears in our context and the social welfare percentage loss. We show that 
the performance of the proposed scheme regarding the above measures is good and the social 
welfare is close to the optimal one. Our methodology is generalized to the case of considering 
more than two different resources which is left for future work. Another direction for further 
research, is the investigation of optimal strategies for providers (that is, which mechanism to 
choose) in case the assumption of known demand is eliminated.   
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